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Abstract 
In the context of the contemporary crisis of neoliberal political economy, the politics of 
austerity has reasserted the liberal utility of the state as the political authority of market 
freedom. The paper argues that economy has no independent existence, and that instead, 
economy is a political practice. It examines the political economy of Adam Smith and the 
German ordoliberal tradition to decipher the character of the political in political economy 
and its transformation from Smith‟s liberal theory into neoliberal theology. Ordoliberalism 
emerged in the late 1920s at a time of a manifest crisis of political economy, and its argument 
was fundamental for the development of the neoliberal conception that free economy is matter 
of strong state authority. The conclusion argues with Marx that the state is the concentrated 
force of free economy. 
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Introduction 
As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown proclaimed to have found the real Smith, 
whom he sought to wrest from the clutches of the political right. According to Brown, the real 
Smith „counterposed the invisible hand of the market to the helping hand of government‟. In 
Matthew Watson‟s view, Brown got it wrong. He asserts that Smith was „suspicious of the 
interventions of a well-meaning government‟ and argued that for Smith the „moral critique of 
excesses of market economy‟ was not a matter of government. Instead Watson argues, Smith 
saw the moral sentiments as a „manifestation of the individual‟s moral faculties‟ and asserts 
that these are „self-tutored‟.2 Watson is right to argue that the Smithean state is not a 
countervailing power to the invisible hand and wrong to assert that Smith was suspicious of 
state intervention. I argue that for Smith, market freedom not only presupposes the political 
state. It is in fact premised on the state as its political authority. Adam Smith provided a 
political economy. The question of political economy is therefore not whether the state 
intervenes or not.
3
 Rather the question is about the purpose and method of intervention. I 
argue that for Smith, the state is the political form of the invisible hand. That is, the economy 
has no independent existence. Rather, it is a practice of government. In distinction to Watson, 
this practice extends to the facilitation of the moral sentiments as the ethical framework that 
of a society governed by the free price mechanism, seeking to hold it together.
4
 
 
The understanding of market liberty as a political practice is core to the ordoliberal tradition 
that emerged in the Germany of the late 1920s as a distinct account about how to reassert 
capitalist rationality in the face of a manifest crisis of a whole political economy. It was the 
first serious attempt at formulating a comprehensive market liberal response to the socialist 
challenges to free economy amidst the turmoil of the late 1920s. It saw itself as developing a 
new liberalism, which they called „neoliberalism‟ in distinction to laissez faire liberalism and 
statist conceptions of political economy
5
. Their account became known later as the Freiburg 
                                               
2 Gordon Brown, „State and Market: Towards a Public Interest Test‟, Political Quarterly, 74:3 (2003), pp. 266-284, 
p. 267. Matthew Watson, „Socialised Sympathy?‟ Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Political 
Studies Association, Swansea (2008), pp. 3, 2, 2. 
3 Andrew Skinner‟s introduction to the Penguin edition of the Wealth of Nations concludes on Smith‟s theory of 
the state but does not expound on its indispensability as the executive power of liberty. Skinner, „Introduction to 
the Penguin edition of The Wealth of Nations‟, in Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (London: Penguin, 1999). 
Simon Clarke‟s account develops Smith‟s state theory in an insightful manner arguing that „the purpose of Smith‟s 
analysis of the economic system was to define the proper role of the state‟. Clarke, Keynesianism, Monetarism and 
the Crisis of the Stat (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), p. 39. See also his Marx, Marginalism and Modern 
Sociology (London: Palgrave, 1992). The paper agrees with this up to a point. It argues that the political state is the 
historical and also analytical presupposition of the system of perfect liberty. 
4 See also Pierre Force, Self-Interest Before Adam Smith (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) and Yerry Evensky, Adam 
Smith‟s Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: CUB, 2005), who argue akin to Watson for the independence of morality 
as a matter that belongs to individuals alone.  
5
 The term „neoliberalism‟ was coined by Alexander Rüstow in 1938.  Rüstow was a founding ordoliberal thinker. 
See Ralf Ptak, „Neoliberalism in Germany‟, in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, The Road from Mont Pelerin 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).  
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school of neoliberalism, which in its Anglo-Saxon reception is almost exclusively associated 
with the work of Friedrich Hayek who joined up with Freiburg after the second world-war 
and, although most important for disseminating its stance, was not central to its original 
conception. Ordoliberalism rejects the statist tradition of German economic thought,
6
 argued 
for economic regulation by the free price mechanism,
7
 conceived of national economy as a 
global economy,
8
 recognised that free economy presupposes the existence not only of a firm 
legal framework but also of a robust social and ethical framework,
9
 and demanded the strong 
state as the means of restoring and sustaining free economy
10
. During the second world-war, 
the ordoliberal founders of Freiburg neoliberalism planned for the liberal re-organising the 
post-war German economy,
11
 and during the 1950s their input into the neoliberal construction 
of Europe proved decisive.
12
  In the late 1970s, Andrew Gamble aptly captured the first wave 
of neoliberal transformation as a project of free economy and strong state, and with this 
phrase he traced the political stance of the incoming Thatcher government back to this 
defining ordoliberal idea.
13
 However, ordoliberalism is more than just about the liberal utility 
of the state as a facilitator of market freedom. It is also an argument about the incorporation 
of the moral sentiments into the social fabric. This insight was well recognised by Foucault 
who in his lectures on neoliberal reason in the late 1970s argued, firstly, that Chicago 
neoliberalism derives from German ordoliberalism
14
 and, secondly, that neoliberal reason 
includes at its core the production of market-conforming personalities by means of what he 
calls a biopolitics, the modernity of which he developed from the ordoliberal conception of a 
Vitalpolitik – a politics to secure the vitality of workers as self-responsible entrepreneurs of 
labour power.
15
  
                                               
6 Keith Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 1750-1950 (Cambridge: CUP, 1995). 
7Thomas Balogh, An Experiment in „Planning‟ by the „Free‟ Price Mechanism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1950). 
8 Dieter Haselbach, Autoritärer Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991). 
9 Werner Bonefeld, „Crisis, Freedom and the Strong State‟, BISA (2011) annual Conference, Manchester. 
10
 Ben Jackson, „At the Origins of Neo-Liberalism: The Free Economy and the Strong State, 1930-1947‟. The 
Historical Journal, 53:1 (2010), pp. 129-151. 
11
 See Anthony Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 1994).  
12 Perry Anderson, „The Europe to Come‟, in Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson (eds.), The Question of Europe 
(London: Verso, 1988), Bernie Moss, „The European Community as Monetarist Construction‟, Journal of 
European Area Studies, 8:2, 2000, pp. 247-265, Werner Bonefeld, „Europe, The Market and the Transformation of 
Democracy‟, Journal of European Area Studies, 13:1, 2005, pp. 93-106. 
13 Andrew Gamble, „The Free Economy and the Strong State‟ Socialist Register 1979 (London: Merlin Press). See 
also Sir Keith Joseph‟s Freedom and Order (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1975), which endorses German 
neoliberalism as the model of market liberal government. 
14 Michel Foucault, Biopolitics (London: Palgrave, 2008). Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason 
(Oxford: OUP, 2010) doubts Foucault‟s claim that Chicago neo-liberalism derives from German ordoliberalism. 
According to Foucault, Chicago neo-liberalism developed core ordoliberal ideas in its own distinctive deregulatory 
manner. Friedman‟s support of, and indeed advisory role in, the Pinochet dictatorship is well known, and does not 
contradict his market-liberal stance. On this see, Werner Bonefeld, „Democracy and Dictatorship‟. Critique, 34:3 
(2006), pp. 237-252. 
15 The publication of Foucault‟s Biopolitics brought the ordoliberal tradition to wider attention -  more often than 
not as a matter of Foucault studies. For example, Michael Behrent, „Liberalism without Humanism‟, Modern 
Intellectual History 6:3 (2009), pp. 539-568, reports on Foucault‟s fascination with neoliberalism, arguing that his 
lectures entail a strategic reorientation from intellectual rebellion to endorsement of economic liberalism. The 
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Conventionally, contemporary neoliberalism is associated with an unfettered economic 
system, particularly finance, and it is seen as a political economy of free economy and weak 
state.
16
 This conception of the neoliberal state is held up even when it is argued that it is a 
powerful enforcer of particularly deregulated and flexible labour markets. Nevertheless, the 
crisis of 2008 is said to have brought the state back in as the decisive actor, placing regulatory 
restrains on the economy to resolve economic crisis and restore economy.
17
 The resurgence of 
the state is said to have led „a more orderly, restrained form of market rule‟,18 in which the 
economy is „subject to controls‟,19 and it is argued that this reassertion of state power is a 
clear indication that ordoliberalism is now be „back in favour‟ as political means of crisis 
resolution,
20
 one that socialises the losses by means of „financial socialism‟, one that balances 
the books by a politics of austerity, and one that, as Jesse Norman explains, seeks resolution 
of the social crisis by putting in place a new moral framework to secure free economy in the 
self-responsible behaviour of individuals.
21
 
 
I argue that Adam Smith did not provide an economic theory. He analysed the political 
economy of what he called commercial society, and conceived of the state as its political 
force. For Smith, the state is the authority that renders viable commercial society by securing 
its moral, social, legal, and, also, its economic order. The ordoliberals reasserted the political 
form of free economy as the means of restoring and maintaining liberal economy in the eye of 
the storm. In this context, the buccaneering neoliberalism of the last two decade is really an 
exception to neoliberal dogma. That is, laissez-faire really is „a highly ambiguous and 
misleading description of the principles on which a liberal policy is based‟.22 Liberty does not 
apply in conditions of disorder, and that is, laissez faire is no answer to social disorder, 
                                                                                                                                      
circumstance that Foucault lectures illuminate the moral, social, and political presuppositions and ideas of 
economic liberalism is of no importance to him. In his view neoliberalism merely serves as an illustration of 
Foucault‟s thought processes. Lois McNay, „Self as Enterprise‟. Theory, Culture & Society 26:6 (2009) pp. 55-77, 
focuses on Foucault's analysis of ordoliberalism and neoliberalism, but when it comes to the politics gets hung up 
on resistance to neoliberalism seemingly oblivious to his discussion of ordoliberalism as the foundation of modern 
neoliberalism. Foucault‟s lectures argue that ordoliberalism amounts to an authoritarian liberal project of economic 
liberty by means of strong state action that seeks prevention of liberal emergencies by means surveillance and 
transformation of the laws of private property into a character trait. 
16 The weak state is one that retreats in the face of global economic power. See, amongst others, Susanne Strange, 
The Retreat of the State (Cambridge, CUP, 1996). See also the debate in Andreas Bieler, Werner Bonefeld, Peter 
Burnham, and Adam Morton, Global Restructuring State , Capital and Labour (London: Palgrave, 2006). 
17 Ulrich Brandt and Andrea Sekler, „Postneoliberalism – catch-word or valuable analytical and political concept?‟, 
Development Dialogue, 51 (2009), pp. 5-13, Bob Jessop, „The „Return‟ of the national state in the current crisis of 
the world market‟, Capital & Class, 34:1 (2010), pp. 38-43. 
18 Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, p. 275. 
19 Eric Sheppard, E. and Helga Leitner, „Quo vadis neoliberalism?‟ Geoforum, 41 (2010), pp. 185-194, p. 188. 
20 Peck , Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, pp. 19, 275. 
21 „You can call it‟, says David Cameron, „liberalism. You can call it empowerment. You can call it freedom. You 
can call it responsibility. I call it The Big Society‟ (cited in Daily Telegraph, 21 July, 2011). Jesse Norman, The 
Big Society (London: University of Buckingham Press, 2010).  
22 Friedrich Hayek, Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 1944) p. 84. 
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economic meltdown, and moral decay, then and now. Rather, laissez faire is a political 
practice. What this means is well brought out by Martin Wolf when he argued that the 
liberalising success of globalisation cannot be built on „pious aspirations but [on] honest and 
organized coercive force‟.23 He does not call for „more government and less liberty‟. He calls 
for more liberty by means of organised force.  
 
The paper argues that for the ordoliberals economic regulation by the invisible hand amounts 
to a constantly renewed authoritative decision for market freedom. The ordoliberal state is an 
ever watchful state. Although their conception of free economy and strong state does not 
depart from, in fact, they expound, the Smithean purpose of the liberal state as the political 
facilitator of the invisible hand, they develop it beyond itself. That is to say, while Smith 
developed his political economy as a social theory of commercial society, establishing the 
rational foundations of the liberal state, the neoliberals transformed it into a theology of the 
strong state. Rather than deriving the veracity of liberty from the development of the division 
of labour, they assert its veracity as political practice of strong state authority.
24
 Liberty thus 
becomes a political decision, which as Hayek explains in The Road to Serfdom, one has to 
make in the face of the collectivist demands for a „freedom from want‟.  
 
The next section introduces the ordoliberal critique of laissez faire liberalism and argues that 
the Germans were wrong to see Smith as a proponent of laissez faire. The follows section 
expounds Smith‟s political economy as a practice of government, and the final section 
develops the ordoliberal understanding of the state as „market police‟. The conclusion draws 
out distinctions between Smith and the ordoliberals and argues that the free economy 
presupposes the political state as the „concentrated and organized force of society‟ (Marx). 
Marx‟s notion that the modern state manages the common affairs of capitalist society does not 
re-invent the proverbial wheel. Rather, it focuses the political character of the seemingly 
apolitical exchange relations on the form of the state.
25
 
 
Political Economy and the Theology of Laissez Faire 
Adam Smith regarded political economy as „a branch of the science of the statesman or 
legislator‟. He conceived of „commercial society‟ as class ridden, and held the state 
indispensable for the organisation and maintenance of market liberty. The state gives order to 
economic freedom by means not only of law but, also by „ordering‟ the conduct of society, 
restraining the passions of „self-love‟ within the framework of the moral sentiments. The 
                                               
23 Martin Wolf, „The need for a new imperialism‟. Financial Times, 10 October 2001. 
24 On this distinction, see Simon Clarke, ‟The Neoliberal Theory of the State‟, in Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah 
Johnston  (eds) Neoliberalism – A Critical Reader (London: Pluto, 2005), pp. 50-59. 
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invisible hand is incapable of integrating society, and removal of, or indeed weakness in, 
public authority will lead to „open violence and bloodshed‟.26 The invisible hand does not 
have an independent existence.  
 
Smith charges the state with removing impediments to market liberty and providing for the 
invisible hand that requisite legal, moral, and social order upon which it depends. The 
Smithean state is not a weak state. It is a strong state. It does not yield to the social interests. 
Instead it governs over them to secure the system of perfect liberty. The Smithean state does 
not compete with the invisible hand as if it were some alternative source of regulative power. 
It renders the invisible hand, and thus governs over society for the sake of economic liberty. 
Hayek focused this insight succinctly when he argued that for the free economy, the liberal 
state is indispensable as a „planner for competition‟.27 
 
Hayek‟s notion is key to the ordoliberal tradition. Its main founding thinkers, especially 
Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alfred Müller-Armack, Wilhelm Röpke, and Alexander 
Rüstow, argued that sustaining a liberal, competitive economy is a matter of strong state 
authority. Rüstow conceived of this strong state in terms of a „market police‟ – a term Smith 
hints at in his Lectures on Jurisprudence where he argues that securing the system of perfect 
liberty belongs to the police. Yet, Rüstow and his colleagues, though praising Smith as an 
economist, are critical of him as the apparent founder of laissez faire liberalism. For the 
ordoliberals, laissez faire liberalism is indefensible. They developed their neo-liberalism in 
opposition to laissez faire liberalism, which at that time was the particular cause celebre of the 
Austrian school of economics, von Mises in particular.
28
 Ordoliberalism argues that economic 
liberty is a practice of government. The system of market freedom does not come about just 
like that.
29
 The state, they say, has to govern for liberty, and such government does not yield 
to the social forces, each seeking material concessions by transforming their own private 
interests into a matter of public policy. The state thus has to be strong to prevent itself from 
becoming the prey of the social interests. For the sake of liberty the state has thus to keep the 
social forces at arm‟s length so that they do not govern through the state. The liberal state has 
                                                                                                                                      
25 Karl Marx, Capital volume I (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1983), p. 703. 
26
 Adam Smith The Wealth of Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 428, 726. 
27 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 31. 
28 The distinction between Austrian laissez faire liberalism and German ordoliberalism is of less importance in the 
context of Realpolitik. See for example, Ludwig von Mises, The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth (Irvington: 
The Foundation of Economic Education, 2000), p. 5. He asserts that uninhibited market forces are the only remedy 
to resolving economic crisis, and then argues that „fascism and similar movements have…saved European 
civilization‟. 
29 Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik  (Tübingen: Mohr Siebert, 2004). 
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to govern over them. The limited state is the strong state
30
. The ordoliberals require the state 
to contain what they identify as the proletarianisation of social structures to secure the civitas 
of an entrepreneurial society. Market freedom, they say, requires the incorporation of the 
moral sentiments of enterprise into a lifestyle.
31
 Incorporation does not derive from some 
economic logic. It is a practice of government.  
 
The ordoliberals criticise Adam Smith for positing the economic as an autonomous thing, 
disregarding the role of the state, and believing in the capacity of the free economy to regulate 
itself by means of the invisible hand. The first of these points is most important. According to 
Röpke „classical economic science had gone astray in conceiving competitive economy as 
autonomous‟, and argues that this stance account is based on a „disastrous belief in the 
sociological autonomy of competitive economy‟. This belief is „the cardinal error of the 
laissez-faire philosophers‟. The idea that economic liberty is akin to a system in which „self-
dependent processes [are] whirring away automatically‟ amounts, they say, to a deistic 
philosophy that is not only blind to the sociological, ethical and political preconditions of 
market liberty.
32
 It is also blind to the destructive impact of unrestraint competition on the 
moral fabric of society. For Rüstow, the idea that liberty will result from unrestrained market 
forces, and that moral restraint on excess is self-tutored, comprises the theology of liberalism. 
He dismisses laissez faire liberalism as a „paleo-liberalism‟, one that is fed by religious 
zealots of economic price, one that believes that society is no more than a resourceful and 
calculable entity of arithmetic equations, and one that unthinkingly allows the emergence of 
its own grave-diggers in the form the proletarianised masses.
33
 Laissez faire, says Rüstow, 
assumes as eternal truth the divine reason of a supposed natural order of things, but does not 
tell us what it is, what it requires, and what needs to be done to sustain, secure and defend it 
not only in the hour of a need but, also, and importantly, pre-emptively to prevent liberal 
emergencies from arising. For the ordoliberals, economic liberty is not a natural thing. It is 
socially created and can thus be destroyed. Its existence requires careful political attention to 
avoid emergencies.  
 
The ordoliberal rejection of Smith‟s theory as a metaphysics has to be seen in the context of 
their battle with the Austrian school of liberalism who proclaimed Smith as their intellectual 
authority. The ordoliberals rejected Austrian laissez faire liberalism not because of its 
                                               
30 This is the theoretical context for Hayek‟s praise of the Pinochet dictatorship. He argued that a state that yields 
to the social forces becomes unlimited in its character, requiring „well-meaning dictators…genuinely anxious to 
restore‟ free economy. Quoted in Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism, p. 168.  
31 Alfred Müller-Armack, „The Social Market Economy as an Economic and Social Order‟, Review of Social 
Economy, 36:3 (1978), pp. 325-331. 
32 Wilhelm Röpke, The Social Crisis of Our Time (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), p. 56. 
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elevation of free economy as the sine qua non of human existence. They rejected it because 
the free economy of laissez faire liberalism is bound to create socially destructive outcomes, 
especially in the form of proletarianised workers who, devoid of the moral sentiments of 
liberty, demand welfare to the detriment of liberty and security of private property. Freedom 
they say requires the acceptance of personal responsibility for that freedom.
34
 The free market 
does not produce responsible workers; it produces proletarianised workers. There is thus need 
for a political authority to prevent proletarianisation. For the ordoliberals, prevention is a 
practice of „market police‟.35  
 
The ordoliberal perception of Smith is blinkered. The next section argues that for Smith the 
system of perfect liberty depends on the state as its political authority. He developed this 
insight against the time of mercantilism with the vigour of a man who saw that the time of 
commercial society had come. The ordo-liberals argued at a time of a profound crisis of 
capitalist civilisation, a time which they dismiss as one of „mass opinion, mass claims, mass 
emotion and mass passion‟, a time which allowed „”mass-produced” men to shirk their own 
responsibility‟ relying instead on „government-organized mass relief‟.36 Society, they say, had 
lost its moral compass, and instead of coping with economic hardship in an entirely self-
responsible manner, demanded „freedom from want‟37. They thus insisted on a strong state 
response to impose social order to reassert economic liberty as a well ordered system of 
freedom and personal responsibility for that freedom. Their argument that the state is the 
executive power of liberty is, I argue, an unacknowledged tribute to Smith‟s political 
economy. Unlike Smith, though, the ordoliberals did not set out to render the system of 
perfect liberty intelligible. They argued for its rescue by means of force. 
 
Smith: Justice, Moral Sentiments and Police 
                                                                                                                                      
33Alexander Rüstow, „General Social Laws of the Economic Disintegration and Possibilities of Reconstruction‟, 
Afterword to Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration (London: Hodge, 1942). 
34 The ordoliberals, Rüstow and Röpke in particular, accept that the freedom of the worker is a double freedom: it 
is the freedom from the means of subsistence and the freedom to sell her labour power to gain subsistence.  They 
therefore argue that resolution of the „workers question‟ has to focus on the determination of the true interest of 
workers, which lies in the progress of the common wealth, see below. Alexander Rüstow, Freiheit und Herrschaft 
(Münster: LIT, 2005), Wilhelm Röpke, A Human Economy (Wilmington Delaware: ISI, 1998). Marx‟s account on 
this freedom of labour can be found in Capital vol. I, ch. 26. Werner Bonefeld, „Primitive Accumulation and 
Capitalist Accumulation‟, Science and Society, 75:3 (2011), pp. 379-399. 
35 See Rüstow‟s  „General Social Laws of the Economic Disintegration and Possibilities of Reconstruction‟. 
36 Röpke, A Human Economy, p. 152; Wilhelm Röpke, Welfare, Freedom and Inflation (London: Pall Mall Press, 
1957), p. 24; Röpke, A Human Economy, p. 155. 
37 Like Hayek, Road to Serfdom, Röpke, Human Economy, p. 172, rejects freedom from want as a most 
„dangerous and seductive‟ enunciation of tyranny.   
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For Smith, production and distribution are regulated through competitive exchanges, 
mediated by money
38
. This regulation is achieved where there is „perfect liberty‟. The price 
mechanism that allows prices to rise and fall above and below the „natural prices‟ is governed 
by the invisible hand, which informs individuals where to invest and what to sell. The 
invisible hand is a depoliticised devise of economic adjustment. Individuals follow price 
signals in a manner of their own choosing. Government or persons do not tell anybody what 
to do, when and where. Nevertheless, its magic requires government to make it effective. 
Impediments to its operation have to be removed. There is need for the defence of private 
property against conquest, foreign invasion, and accumulation of wealth by means of piracy 
and robbery. For Smithy, wealth results from the expenditure of productive labour. Then there 
is justice and the rules of justice, which he says are directed against the threat to property 
presented by the poor.  
 
For Smith, „justice…is the main pillar that holds up the whole edifice‟ of commercial 
society.
39
 Justice is a matter not only of law and the rule of law, which is the regulative force 
of the freedom of contract between ostensibly equal exchange subjects.
40
 Fundamentally, it is 
a matter of order as the precondition of law. The rule of law does not agree with social 
disorder, and law does not enforce order. Police enforces order and in this manner renders the 
rule of law effective. The system of justice is also dependent upon a moral order that commits 
individuals to the rules of justice. The rules of justice, then, presuppose a social order and 
unfold within a moral framework. The removal of impediments to the free movement of 
prices entails thus also the provision of morally committed participants in market freedom. In 
this sense, the invisible hand represents the bad-infinity of a system that is constantly striving 
for perfection by means of a political effort at removing obstacles from its operation. That is, 
the system of perfect liberty cannot be entrusted to the economy. Rather, it amounts to a 
constant political effort at restraining the passions of competition according to the rules of 
justice, formatting the moral sentiments of individual enterprise, and containing the rebellious 
character of the poor to secure those further improvements in the productive power of labour 
upon which the prospects of the common wealth rest.  
 
According to Smith, the moral sentiments of commercial society are based on the sense of the 
„propriety‟ of the beauty of a well-ordered whole. This whole gives purpose and benefit to the 
private individuals. It restrains their passions that are governed by „self-love.‟ The private 
                                               
38 This part draws on Clarke, Keynesianism, Monetarism and the Crisis of the State, Clarke, Marx, Marginalism 
and Modern Sociology, and Werner Bonefeld, „Free Economy and the Strong State‟, Capital & Class, 34:1 (2010), 
pp. 15-24. 
39 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 86. 
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individuals are interested only in themselves, and yet each individual is obliged to all other 
individuals. The pursuit of their unsocial interests rests thus on their fundamental sociability, 
which restrains their conduct within a well-ordered whole. He argues that the basis of judging 
the propriety of the whole is „sympathy‟. Sympathy is the ability of individuals to adopt the 
position of the „impartial and well informed spectator‟. However, sympathy is not sufficient 
to contain the fundamental condition of commercial society, that is, „self-love‟. A society 
based on the pursuit of self-interest requires a moral foundation, a moral fabric and an ethical 
framework, to sustain it. The moral sentiments alone are thus not sufficient for maintaining a 
society of self-seekers. On the part of the self-interested individuals, the moral sentiments 
express, firstly, the charitable site of commercial society, or as Marx put it in the Holy 
Family, its sentimentality.
41
 Inasmuch as the concept of „free labour contains the pauper‟,  42 
the character trait of private property combines cutthroat competition and robust enforcement 
of labour discipline on the factory floor, stealing atoms of additional labour time, with an 
impulse to charity for the poor and downtrodden. Secondly, for Smith the state renders the 
moral sentiments valid as the impartial and well informed spectator of the system of liberty. 
That is, for the Smith the political state is not really an impartial and well informed spectator. 
Rather, it is charged with making the system of perfect liberty valid.  The state is thus the 
impartial and informed enforcer of the rules of perfect liberty.
43
 Without such enforcement 
market impediments and social disorder will result, undermining the capacity of the invisible 
hand to transform private vices into public virtues. For Smith, the state governs in the true 
interests of the common wealth, appealing to and connecting with what is deemed the honest 
core of individuals, restraining their immediate individual interests and class interests within a 
moral framework that both legitimises the system of justice and embeds the morality of 
private property, sympathy and competitiveness, into the inner recess of society.
44
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
40 On this, see Robert Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law (London: Pluto, 1981) and Evgeny Pashukanis, Law 
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Sentiments), p. 161. The impartial spectator is both a particular residing in each individual and a universal in re, 
which is independent from the individuals and their self-interested calculations. The state is the force of moral 
entrenchment, and punishment. 
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For the sake of liberty it is thus necessary to employ „the power of the commonwealth‟, that 
is, the state, „to enforce the practice of justice. Without this precaution, commercial society 
will descend into bloodshed and disorder, every man revenging himself at his own hand 
whenever he fancied he is injured‟. Punishment is the condition of justice. „All men delight‟ 
to see injustice „punished‟, and injustice needs to „be punished…on account of the order of 
society‟. Further, only those who do „not violate the laws of justice [are] left perfectly free to 
pursue their own way, and to bring both their industry and their capital into competition with 
any other man, or order of man‟.45 In the Wealth of Nations he argues further that the state is 
responsible for securing the proper use of freedom – it punishes the misuse of freedom, 
enforces the moral sentiments of freedom, and intervenes into the moral make up of 
individuals, restraining the passions for the benefit of the common wealth. In this context, he 
argues that the state is responsible for establishing the exact administration of justice, 
adjudicating between clashes of interests and equal rights, erecting and maintaining public 
works and public institutions upon which the pursuit of commercial society depends.
46
 
Furthermore, the state is responsible for achieving the „cheapness of provision‟, that is, for 
facilitating the progressive division of labour by means of greater labour productivity.
47
 Smith 
thus argues that the „system of private property necessarily requires the establishment of civil 
government…Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in 
reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some 
property against those who have none at all‟,48 and he maintains therefore that the defence of 
private property against the poor is in fact undertaken in the interest of the poor. The state is 
the embodiment of the impartial observer, which upholds by means of force the beauty of the 
system as a whole for the benefits of every individual. That is, the ignorance of the poor 
prevents them from understanding what is in their own best interest. According to Smith, the 
unimpeded operation of the system of perfect liberty improves the conditions of the poor as 
wealth once accumulated in the hands of the rich, tends to trickle down – the bigger the cake, 
the bigger the poor slice.  
 
Smith introduces the class struggle between capital and labour arguing that „wages depend 
upon contract between two parties whose interests are not the same‟. That is, the „workmen 
desire to get a lot, the master to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine 
to raise, the latter to lower the wages of labour‟. In this struggle, the masters have the upper 
hand because they „are fewer in number, and combine much more easily; they can live for 
                                               
45 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, pp. 340, 89, 91, 749. 
46 See Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p. 723. 
47 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 6. 
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longer without getting their profits, the workers are starved‟.49 That workers rebel is 
understandable given their „desperate conditions‟. Yet, their action is foolish because „the 
masters react with purpose and force the worker back and that is, the workmen very seldom 
derive any advantage from the violence of those tumultuous combinations‟. The only way to 
raise wages and improve conditions is by sustained accumulation. „Workers do well not to 
struggle‟, because with the increase of surplus, stock accumulates, increasing the number of 
workers, and the increase of revenue and stock is the increase of national wealth. Thus, „the 
demand for those who live by wages…increases with the increase in national wealth‟. This, 
then, is the famous trickle-down effect - accumulation, he argues, increases national wealth 
and „occasions a rise in the wage of labour‟.50 Smith calls this the „liberal reward for labour‟, 
and one consequence of his argument is, of course, that if there are poor, this indicates that 
„things are at a stand‟, requiring state action to facilitate „the cheapness of goods of all 
sorts‟,51 that is, to increase labour productivity and thus to improve price competitiveness in a 
world governed by the magic of the invisible hand.  
 
The common wealth is a world market reality
52
. The owners of stock in some countries might 
achieve higher rates of return on their investment than owners in some other countries, „which 
no doubt demonstrate[s] the redundancy of their stock‟.53 That is, „the proprietor of stock is 
properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country. He 
would be apt to abandon the country in which he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition, in 
order to be assessed to a burdensome tax, and would remove his stock to some other country 
where he could either carry on his business, or enjoy his fortune more at his ease‟.54 Thus, in 
order to maintain stock and retain investment, there arises the need for increased labour 
productivity to secure the „cheapness of provision‟. Its facilitation is a matter of „police‟.55 
Smith thus conceives of the state as a facilitator of price competitiveness by means of greater 
labour productivity to secure the common wealth. Resolution to the workers‟ desperate 
conditions and quarrelsome nature does not lie in the admittedly unequal exchange relation 
between capital and labour. Resolution lies in the dynamic increase in wages that depend on 
the most rapid possible growth in the demand for labour, which results from the growth of the 
                                               
49 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p. 83. 
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market, increase in trade and commerce, and which is based on the division of labour, which 
in turn is fed by greater labour productivity.  
 
However, although according to Smith, „national wealth‟ and „workers‟ benefit from 
progressive accumulation, the owners of stock might not because „the increase in stock, which 
raises wage, tends to lower profit‟.56 In this context, too, the state acts in fact as the impartial 
enforcer of the system of perfect liberty. That is, higher wages benefit capital too by 
stimulating the growth of population, the expansion of trade and the division of labour, and 
the industriousness of the worker. Nevertheless, capitalists pursue their own class interests 
and might therefore seek to maintain the rate of profit artificially, impeding the natural liberty 
of the market, for example by means of price fixing or protectionism. This assertion of private 
power „produces what we call police. Whatever regulations are made with respect to the 
trade, commerce, agriculture, manufactures of the country are considered as belonging to the 
police‟.57 Effective policing entails a strong state, a state where it belongs: over and above the 
egoistic interests and class struggles, partial to none, that is, ostensibly not governing in 
favour of this or that social interest but in the interest of the beauty of the well ordered whole, 
securing its propriety. The state thus governs in the interests of the bonum commune of 
commercial society, restraining the passions of „self-love‟ and short term class interests, be it 
greed, protection of short term profit interests, or the rebelliousness of the poor who demand 
public provision of relief to meet subsistence needs. Concerning the poor, police is needed to 
make the worker accept that „if he is frugal and industrious, [s/he] may enjoy a greater share 
of the necessaries and conveniences of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire‟. There 
is thus need, also, for a public system of education to promote „the instruction of the people‟ 
chiefly by means of education and public diversions.
58
 He argued that government should take 
pains to offset the socially and morally destructive effects of accumulation, by assuming 
responsibility for cultural activities to maintain the civility of the unsocial interests.  
 
In sum, the administration of justice, which secures property and the person, and which 
defends the rich against the poor, describes an „order of good government‟ that despite 
appearances to the contrary, is in the interest of the poor. Government is to sustain the 
propriety of the system to advance the „true‟ interests of each individual. The state recognises 
the ignorance of the poor who react to conditions in an aggressive manner, and governs over 
them so that they may benefit from the liberal reward that the progressive development of the 
productive power of labour may accord to them. In addition, the state enforces the system of 
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perfect liberty upon the owners of stock to contain their passion within the framework of law, 
order, morality and sociability. For the benefit of everybody in society, the political state 
enforces the discipline of a globally effective competitive system to sustain the further 
division of labour, global trade and markets, on the basis of improved labour productivity. 
The purpose of the state is thus to secure for the invisible hand that perfect order upon which 
the progress of commercial society depends. It eradicates disorder, establishes the rules of 
justice, facilitates the moral sentiments and restrains the passions, secures the cheapness of 
provision and achieves greater labour productivity, and instructs the people. As the impartial 
observer of the system of perfect liberty, the state maintains „the rich in the possession of their 
wealth against the violence and rapacity of the poor‟ and it does so for the benefit of the 
poor.
59
 It is in the poor‟s self-interest to let wealth trickle up to allow for that improvement of 
conditions which only economic growth can furnish. 
 
Ordoliberalism and Human Economy 
Smith‟s notion that frugality and industriousness is fundamental to the prospects of liberal 
economy is central to the ordoliberal stance. It conceives of „enterprise competition‟ as a 
„public duty‟.60 Government is responsible for the provision of a firm ethical framework to 
secure liberty in the face of „greedy self-seekers‟ and labour struggles for employment, 
conditions, and welfare.
 61
 The ordoliberals concede that capitalism has a natural tendency to 
create proletarianised workers who, they say, exist in a devitalised state: proletarianised 
workers seek material well-being at the expense of individual enterprise. For them, a 
proletarianised worker is one who rebels against regulation of wage income by means of the 
free price mechanism. Nothing is worse, writes Böhm in 1937, than a condition in which the 
capacity of the free price mechanism to regulate peacefully the coordination of, and 
adjustment between, millions and millions of individual preferences only for „the will of the 
participants to rebel against that movement‟.62 Ill-will is an impediment to free economy and 
needs to be „removed‟. 
 
They conceive of liberty as the freedom of the entrepreneur to engage in competition to seek 
gratification by means of voluntary exchanges. Free markets are governed by the principles of 
scarcity, private property, freedom of contract, and exchange between equal legal subjects, 
each pursuing their own self-interested ends. The free market allows social cooperation 
between individuals by means of a „signalling system‟, that is, the price mechanism. It thus 
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requires monetary stability to permit its effective operation as a „calculating machine‟ that 
informs consumers and producers of the degree of scarcity in the whole economy. Prices, says 
Röpke „are orders by the market to producers and consumers to expand or to restrict‟.63 They 
thus endorse the free market as a particular „social instrument‟ that allows „for greater chance 
for personal responsibility and individual freedom‟.64 However, freedom is troublesome. It 
requires surveillance so that it does not go astray, preventing its misuse as prices can be fixed, 
markets carved up, and competitive adjustment avoided by means of protectionism and 
manipulation of monetary policy; and workers can strike, the masses can revolt, and a 
proletarianised mass society can force the state to concede welfare. The free market requires 
therefore strong state authority to assure the market-liberal utility of freedom. Order is 
sociability, and there can be no freedom without order. They argue that order does not derive 
from free markets. Rather, free markets depend on the existence of order. Law regulates order 
and effective order is a matter of „police‟.   
 
They thus argue that competition is an instrument of freedom only if it is not extended beyond 
the economic sphere. That is, „we do not demand more from competition than it can give. It is 
a means of establishing order and exercising control in the narrow sphere of a market 
economy based on the division of labour, but not a principle on which the whole society can 
be built. From the sociological and moral point of view, it is even dangerous because it tends 
more to dissolve than to unite. If competition is not to have the effect of a social explosive 
and is at the same time not to degenerate, its premise will be a correspondingly sound political 
and moral framework. There should be strong state…a high standard of business ethics, an 
undegenerated community of people ready to co-operate with each other, who have a natural 
attachment to, and a firm place in society‟.65 The market mechanism does not supply morally 
decisive and socially coherent outcomes in support of its further development. The moral 
sentiments of private property have therefore no price and can thus not be determined by the 
highest bidder or strongest party. They are public goods that if properly arranged facilitate the 
utility machine of the market. Their arrangement, they say, is a political task undertaken to 
secure the system as a whole.  
 
For the ordoliberals, laissez faire liberalism is thus tantamount to disaster. It opens the gate of 
opportunity to greed and allows the entirely self-serving individuals of economic price to run 
riot. They accept that greed is a fundamental economic value. It oils the machinery of 
competition and secures the effective regulation of liberty by the free price mechanism. 
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However, if unrestrained by law and the system of morality, it erodes the fundamental 
sociability of a competitive society with costly consequences. Once political authority fails in 
its provision, social order is subject to abuse by the social interests, including the welfare 
seeking proletarians. They argue that social crisis is brought about by the „revolt of the 
masses‟, which a weak state is unable to contain. This revolt manifests a proletarian 
personality that is devoid of the moral sentiments of a free society, and that instead of 
adjusting to markets, rebels against market pressures seeking collective means of subsistence 
support. The revolting masses must be countered „the revolt of the elite‟ to reassert the utility 
machine of the market as an instrument of freedom.
66
  
 
For the ordoliberals, poverty is not material in character. Rather, it shows a lack of enterprise 
on the part of the poor. Fundamentally, poverty is characterised by a poverty of aspiration. A 
proletarian personality compounds the conditions of poverty. Instead of helping themselves 
and others to cope with economic shocks, it subverts the moral sentiments that affect the 
system of liberty. Proletarianised workers lack the moral stamina to provide for themselves 
and do not accept economic freedom as a personal responsibility. For the sake of moral 
economy, the state has to resist demands for welfare provision – conceding welfare means 
that the state loses its „independence‟ from society and is „devoured‟ by the social forces. 67 
Instead of governing over them, they govern through the state to the detriment of the poor 
themselves who find themselves enslaved by a welfare state, which reduces them to „an 
obedient domesticated animal [that is kept] in the state‟s giant stables‟.68 They say, this is a 
state of utter social devitalisation, spiritual abandonment, and one in which the utility machine 
of freedom grinds to a halt, and with it the prospects of the common wealth, which provides 
for everyone on the conditions that they accept their entrepreneurial responsibilities and 
adjust to price signals and market conditions willingly and on their own initiative.
69
  Progress, 
they declare, should not be measured by welfare-induced material well being. Rather, it 
should be measured by what the masses can do for themselves „out of their own resources and 
on their own responsibility‟.70 That is to say, welfare provision „devitalises‟ workers and dis-
empowers them as entrepreneurs. Fundamentally, they are „devitalised‟ because they are not 
possessed by the „ethic and spirit of the bourgeois‟.71 Unbeknown to themselves, workers do 
however aspire to become full members of the bourgeois „civitas‟ and full employment 
policies and welfare security are therefore „repugnant to the workers‟ own sense of freedom‟, 
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that expresses the honest core of their being.
72
  Ordo-liberal social policy is thus deemed to be 
in the true interest of workers. 
 
The ethical formation of the market-conforming structures of behaviour is essential. Echoing 
Smith‟s view that, if left to its own devices, commercial society will descend into bloodshed 
and disorder, Röpke argued that without strong state authority the competitive market society 
will „degenerate into a vulgar brawl‟ that threatens to break society up.73 The state is 
indispensible as the force of sustaining sociability. In this context, Müller-Armack argued that 
economic growth is the best possible means of social cohesion.
74
 That is, sustained economic 
growth undercuts working class dissatisfaction by providing employment and security of 
wage income. The „social content‟ of the system of economic liberty is thus economic growth 
itself.
75
 Only the „total mobilisation of the economic forces allows us to hope for social 
improvements, which achieve real social contents by means of increased productivity‟.76 The 
free market is therefore a social economy because it will eventually trigger the (in)famous 
trickle-down effect of wealth, improving the conditions of the poor. A proper „social policy‟ 
does therefore not redistribute wealth. Instead it aims at sustaining an entrepreneurial society, 
and intervenes into the mentality of quarrelsome workers by establishing a connection 
between the „human beings and private property‟.77 Money, says Röpke, „is coined freedom‟78 
and the exercise of this freedom comprises „the bourgeois total order‟ which a proletarian 
tyranny cannot abide.
79
 
 
For the ordoliberals, the system of economic liberty contains „the natural tendency towards 
proletarianization‟ requiring state action to sustain it. The free economy „must be conquered 
anew each day‟ to secure economic liberty, incorporating the sentiments of liberty into „into a 
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total life-style‟.80 Free economy is therefore a constant political practice of what they call 
Vitalpolitik - a politics of life or a bio-politics that sustains the society of willing, responsible, 
and entirely reliable entrepreneurs who see poverty as an incentive to do better, perceive 
unemployment as an opportunity for employment, and secure employment by pricing 
themselves into jobs. Freedom depends on the moral sentiments of freedom. They therefore 
see the free economic as a moral economy. In this sense, the strong state does not really 
govern over society. Rather, as the political force of market discipline, it governs through 
society to secure the transformation and multification of the social fabric into competitive 
enterprises.
81
 That is, they reject the socialisation of the state and instead demand the 
„etatisation of society‟.82 Given the natural tendency towards proletarianization, the 
ordoliberal idea of freedom is essentially a practice of government. That is, freedom requires 
an ever-vigilant security state to prevent the misuse of freedom and, if need be, to restore 
freedom restrained by rules and tied to the moral values of responsible entrepreneurship. In 
the late 1920s,
 
they therefore called for a commissarial dictatorship to cope with the „extreme 
emergency‟83 that had arisen because the great majority of society lacked the „moral stamina‟ 
to absorb economic shocks.
84
 That is, and as Hayek put it most succinctly, at a time of liberal 
emergency, „the most fundamental principles of a free society…may have to be temporarily 
sacrificed…[to preserve] liberty in the long run‟.85 The prize for the sacrifice of freedom „is 
freedom‟ itself.86 For the ordoliberals, the state of economic liberty is an ever-vigilant security 
state, which is tasked with ensuring that every person is first and foremost recommended to 
his or her own care as an entrepreneur.
87
  
 
In sum, ordoliberalism asserts the authority of the state as the political force of free economy. 
Freedom is freedom within the framework of order, and order is a matter of political 
authority. Only on the basis of order can economic freedom flourish, and can a free people be 
trusted to adjust to the price mechanism in the entirely self-responsible manner of the rule 
abiding and ever so innovative entrepreneur. For the ordoliberals, the task of sustaining 
market liberty on the basis of the rule of law is not enough. Fundamentally, as Röpke
88
 puts it, 
market behaviour needs to be embedded into „psycho-moral forces‟ of society, containing the 
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proletarianisation of workers, restraining the „greedy self-seekers‟, and ingraining the 
discipline of self-responsible enterprise into the moral fabric of society. 
 
Conclusion  
The Adam Smith who is said to have argued for the autonomy of the economic is quite unlike 
the Adam Smith who authored The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759, delivered The 
Lectures on Jurisprudence between 1762-1764, and published The Wealth of Nations in 1776. 
I have argued that for Smith the autonomy of the economy is a political task, comprising the 
removal of impediments to the market, restraint of the passions of competition within a legal 
and moral framework, and enforcement of social order to secure the system of perfect liberty. 
Without government, liberty descends into „disorder and bloodshed‟. Government civilises 
society and sustains its civility. For Smith, police is the premise of liberty. For the 
ordoliberals, liberty has become a practice of a watchful „security state‟, which in the words 
of Böhm no longer governs over society. It governs through society and the individuals that 
comprise it. Freedom, he says, depends on the statification of society to secure what Röpke 
calls the psycho-moral forces of society. They argue that freedom is a matter of market police 
and market police is a practice of freedom – to enforce the laws of justice, achieve the 
cheapness of provision, and maintain the moral sentiments of private property. Like Smith 
they demand the removal of the impediments to the perfect system of liberty, and they call 
upon the state as market police to ensure the continuous improvements in labour productivity 
as the fundamental condition for the progress of the common wealth. They see that economic 
liberty contains not only the pauper but also the tendency towards proletarianisation, and they 
therefore demand the empowerment of individuals as responsible market agents. For them, 
economics is a dismal science precisely because it claims to be a science. Economics turns 
human effort into a calculable equation that knows the price of everything, reduces every 
conceivable human endeavour to an arithmetic expression of costs and benefits, and knows 
the social value of nothing. For the ordoliberals, the attainment of the moral sentiments and 
social order is more important than GDP, inasmuch as GDP does neither breed the moral 
sentiments nor provide for liberty that the social order, upon which its progress depends. The 
laws of justice do not apply to disorder. They thus reject laissez faire liberalism as a doctrine 
of faith in the automaticity of a system of numbers. When the going gets tough, it is incapable 
of defending itself. The ordoliberal Smith is the Smith of the moral sentiments and market 
police, of the laws of justice and empowered entrepreneurship. Compared with the ordoliberal 
Smith, the Smith of laissez faire liberalism is a caricature.  
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The difference between the ordo-liberals and Smith is that unlike Smith, the ordoliberals do 
not provide a social theory of capitalist social relations. They demand strong state action as 
the means of liberty in the face of a manifest crisis of political economy. Their stance 
expresses the theology of liberalism – they demand strong state authority as a means of 
asserting the veracity of market liberty. Smith, in contrast, does not even utter the word 
„liberalism‟. There was no such system to defend. His theory of the common wealth based on 
invisible principles of market freedom and of the state as the means of rendering effective the 
system of perfect liberty ridding it from impediments, looked forward to a world that still had 
to be born. He saw the emergence of commercial society as a consequence of the human 
propensity to truck and barter, which develops through the ages by means of an ever greater 
division of labour towards the separation of the economic and political as interdependent 
spheres in and of commercial society. That is, for Smith, the system of perfect liberty is the 
unplanned outcome of the processes of a natural human propensity. This conception of 
historical becoming was well put by Adam Ferguson in 1782: „nations stumble upon 
establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any 
human design‟.89 For the ordoliberals, in contrast, the free economy is a political creation and 
the outcome of a political decision, and if need be, it is imposed by the state
90
. Unlike Smith, 
the ordoliberals did not look forward to a new liberal world – they sought to prevent its 
collapse, and asserted the means of rescue. For them „liberalising‟ society was not an option. 
It had to be ordered anew by means of strong state authority. In the late 1920, they therefore 
demanded the full force of the state to secure the liberal empowerment of individuals in the 
self-responsible use of economic freedom, and like theological avengers, moved from the 
lectern to the barricade, demanding a commissarial dictatorship to reassert order and morality.  
 
The political response to the crisis of 2008 – financial socialism for the few and austerity for 
the many – illustrates well the practical meaning of Marx‟s notion of the state as the executive 
committee of the bourgeoisie. This notion reveals the liberal truth of the capitalist state. 
Smith‟s political theory and the ordoliberal call to arms expound with great clarity its 
character as the political form of bourgeois society. The capitalist state is neither independent 
from the economy nor does it derive from it. The economic has no independent existence. It is 
a practice of government. The state, says Milton Friedman, provides for the „organisation of 
economy activity‟.91 That is, the state is not defined in relationship to the economic, and nor is 
the economic defined in relationship to the state, a view which implies a conception of market 
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and state as two distinct modes of social organization, and the perennial question about such a 
conception is whether the market has autonomy vis-à-vis the state, characterising its retreat, 
or the state vis-à-vis the market, characterising its resurgence. Political economy defines the 
state not by its relationship to the market but by class. That is, it governs for the well-ordered 
civil society to achieve that cheapness of provision, which results from improvements in the 
productive power of labour. There can thus be no economic crisis. Economy is a political 
economy. Economic crises are crises of political economy. That is, a crisis expresses a 
political failure. The state failed either in removing impediments to market freedom or in 
restraining the passions of competition or greed, or it failed in securing the cheapness of 
provision, or it failed in facilitating the requisite psycho-moral forces of enterprise, etc. 
Marx‟s conception of the state as the concentrated and organised force of society – „of society 
viewed in relationship to itself‟ – focuses political economy as a political practice. As the 
organised force of liberty the state facilitates its order.
92
  
 
Marx‟s stance elucidates the liberal paradox that the state always governs too much and too 
little. The market liberal assertion that uninhibited market forces are the only remedy to 
resolving economic crisis is deceitful. Uninhibited markets describe a political practice of 
eliminating impediments to free economy. The contemporary idea of the Big Society is 
equally deceitful. If anything at all, it is a political practice that in the face of the „deepest cuts 
to public spending in living memory‟ and predicted job losses of five hundred thousand 
public sector workers by 2014,
93
 demands a big society response to cope with austerity out of 
its own resources and by means of its own responsibility. In the big society there can be no 
commitment to „stop making capitalism‟.94 As the proponent of Red Toryism and advocate of 
the Big Society, Philip Bond, argues, there can only be entrepreneurial commitments to 
secure that step-change in labour productivity upon which the future prospects of free 
economy depend.
95
 To their credit, the ordoliberals are robust about the liberal utility of the 
state as the indispensable power of market freedom and entrepreneurial responsibility. They 
understand that for the sake of free economy, the state cannot have enough power - an 
apolitical enterprise society requires the „political state‟ (Marx) as its concentrated force.  
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